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Notes
AGGRAVATED BATTERY - THE FIST OR TEETH AS A DANGEROUS
WEAPON- Defendant had been convicted of aggravated battery,
the attack upon his victim having been perpetuated by means of
the offender's teeth and fists. The supreme court ordered the
verdict and sentence annulled, and the case remanded on a pro-
cedural point. However, Justice Kennon in speaking for the court,
significantly declared:
"It is true that portions of the human anatomy may be
dangerous and the bare hands of a merciless assailant may
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quite readily 'produce death or great bodily harm,' particu-
larly if the victim be young or weak, but the fact remains that
there must be proof of the use of some inanimate instrumen-
tality before a defendant can be held guilty of assault 'with a
dangerous weapon'."'
State v. Calvin, 209 La. 257, 24 So. (2d) 467 (1945).
This statement, if considered alone and without relation to
the facts of the instant case, would indicate that a "dangerous
weapon" must consist of some "inanimate instrumentality." The
Louisiana Criminal Code specifically provides that a "dangerous
weapon" includes any instrumentality, "which, in the manner
used, is calculated or likely to produce death or great bodily
harm."'2 Since the question presented by this decision is res nova
in Louisiana it is necessary to consider the jurisprudence of sister
states to ascertain the merit of the interpretation placed on the
above codal provision in the principal case.
In the Arkansas case of Warren v. State,3 the defendant was
convicted of aggravated assault under a statute requiring a "dead-
ly weapon, instrument, or other thing. '4 The victim had been
knocked down, unmercifully beaten, and kicked in the head while
he was down. The court stated, "There was no evidence to show
that Warren assaulted Tardy, 'with a deadly weapon, instrument,
or other thing,' and he therefore could not have been legally con-
victed of an aggravated assault."'5 This position was affirmed in
a later case6 in which the court stated:
"[The case of Warren v. State] shows that where one
attacks another using no other weapon than by striking with
his fist, or kicking he does not use a deadly weapon in the
sense of the statute. The shoes which a man wears as part of
his ordinary apparel, in the common acceptation of the term,
are not deadly weapons within the meaning of the statute....
A powerful man-a Dempsey or Firpo-might kill one by
striking with the fist or kicking with the foot; but a great
bodily injury by this means would not be an assault with a
deadly weapon, instrument, or other thing, in the sense of
the statute.'"
1. 209 La. 257, 266, 24 So.(2d) 467, 469 (1945).
2. Art. 2, La. Crini. Code of 1942.
3. 88 Ark. 322, 114 S.W. 705 (1908).
4. Ark. Dig. Stat. (Pope, 1937) § 2960.
5. 88 Ark. 322. 323, 114 S.W. 705 (1908).
6. Wilson v. State, 162 Ark. 495, 258 S.W. 972, 33 A.L.R. 1182 (1924).
7. 162 Ark. 494, 496, 258 S.W. 972, 33 A.L.R. 1182, 1183. A dissent, while
apparently conceding that kicking does not constitute an assault with a
1947]
586 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. VII
In evaluating these decisions it is significant to note that the
Arkansas statute requires a "deadly weapon," as distinguished
from a "dangerous weapon" required by the Louisiana Criminal
Code.s
California's statute specifically covers all types of weapons,
embracing "Every person who commits an assault . . .with a
deadly weapon, or instrument or by means of force likely to pro-
duce great bodily injury."9 The California court has held several
times that the fist may be the "means of force likely to produce
great bodily injury."'0 Arizona 11 and Idaho" have similar stat-
utes. A New York statute specifically covers the situation, pro-
viding that
"A person who wilfully and wrongfully wounds or inflicts
grievous bodily harm upon another either with or without a
weapon; or wilfully . . . assaults another by the use of a
weapon, or other instrument .. . is guilty of assault in the
second degree."' 8
Under a Texas statute an assault or battery becomes aggravated
when serious injury is inflicted upon the person assaulted; when
committed by a person of robust health, or strength upon an aged
person; when committed with a deadly weapon under circum-
"deadly" weapon, states that the statute governing the case does not require
that the assault be committed with a "deadly" weapon, but with anything
that could be used as such to produce great bodily injury.
8. A deadly weapon is a weapon likely to produce death or great bodily
injury, while a dangerous weapon is a milder term yet otherwise of same
meaning, for a weapon may be dangerous without being deadly. State v.
Walden, 41 N.M. 418, 70 P.(2d) 149, 150 (1937).
While "deadly" and "dangerous" are not equivalents, deadly is more
than the equivalent, and includes the full signification of dangerous. A dan-
gerous weapon may possibly not be deadly, but a deadly weapon, one which
is capable of causing death, must be dangerous. State v, Lynch, 88 Me. 195,
33 AtI. 978 (1895).
9. Cal. Pen. Code (Deering, 1937) § 245.
10. Defendant struck Lepter several severe blows in the face in an effort
to get away and avoid arrest after Lepter caught him rifling his car. Held;
these blows constitute an assault with force and justified a conviction of
aggravated battery if the court believed from the evidence that the force
used was "likely to produce great bodily injury." People v. Score, 48 CaI.(2di
495, 120 P.(2d) 62 (1941).
Defendant committed a battery on Mrs. Bryan by choking her and beat-
ing her neck and face with his fist. Held; whether the force applied is
likely to produce great bodily injury is a question of fact for the triers of
facts. People v. Schmedt, 66 Cal.(2d) 253, 152 P.(2d) 1021 (1944). See People
v. Bunbaugh, 48 Cal. (2d) 791, 120 P.(2d) 703 (1942); People v. Collup, 27
Cal.(2d) 829, 161 P.(2d) 576 (1945); People v. Tallman, 27 Cal.(2d) 716, 166 P.
(2d) 857 (1945); People v. Pilgrim, 166 P.(2d) 636 (Cal. 1946); People v.
Orona, 164 P.(2d) 769 (1946).
11. Ariz. Rev. Code Ann. (Struckmeyer, 1928) § 43-605.
12. Idaho Code Ann. (1932) § 17-1206.
13. N. Y. Penal Law § 242.
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stances not amounting to an intent to murder or maim; and when
committed with premeditated design and by the use of means
calculated to inflict great bodily injury. 4 It has been held by the
Texas court that the hand or fist may be the means calculated to
inflict great bodily injury.15
None of' the cases have classified the fist or teeth as a "dan-
gerous weapon," but neither is there any authority for the prop-
osition that a weapon must be "inanimate." The weight of au-
thority and the Louisiana Criminal Code classify a dangerous
weapon as "any instrumentality, which, in the manner used is
likely to produce death or great bodily harm.'16 Webster defines
instrumentality as a means, but does not qualify it as either ani-
mate or inanimate. 17 Hence, the word "instrumentality," as used
in the Louisiana Criminal Code, may be interpreted broadly
enough to include both animate and inanimate implements.
Many undesirable results might follow from a strict adher-
ence to the test enunciated in the principal case. The offender
who put out his victim's eye with his finger would pay only the
penalty for simple battery, while his fellow offender who put out
his victim's eye with a pencil would pay the penalty for aggra-
vated battery. An offender causing serious injury with artificial
dentures could be convicted of aggravated battery, while an of-
fender causing the same kind of injury with his natural teeth
would be held only for simple battery. The potential danger of
the method used should be the test of a "dangerous weapon,"
whether it be a knife, the teeth, the. fist, a gun, a stick, a dog, or
any other animate or inanimate instrumentality. When and if a
proper aggravated case arises, it is hoped that this approach to
the problem will be followed by the supreme court.
RUBy STOUT
14. Tex. Ann. Pen. Code (Vernon, 1938) Art. 1147.
15. Defendant struck his victim, who was a prisoner in custody of an
officer, a blow on the head, and knocked him down some steps, saying, "I
intend to knock you down those steps." Held; that an aggravated assault can
be committed with the fist, and that such means when used with premedi-
tated design are and may be calculated to inflict great bodily injury are
abundantly attested by the facts in the case. Keley v. State, 12 Tex. Crim.
App. 245 (1882).
Defendants banded together, caught their victim, and while part of
them held.him the others gave him a severe beating in the face with their
fists. The court stated, "In our view, the circumstances of this case show
that six stalwart men banded themselves together to give Dial a serious
beating with their fists, and under the circumstances the means used were
such as were calculated to inflict great bodily injury on prosecutor." Yeary
v. State, 66 S.W. 1106 (1902).
1A. Art. 2, La. Crim. Code of 1942.
17. Webster defines instrumentality as "that which is instrumental;
means; medium; or agency."
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